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American Studies scholars have long been aware that their interdisciplinary stud-
ies reach far beyond Americana. The fields of folklore, English, history, political science 
and anthropology have all been enveloped under the American Studies umbrella. Public 
perceptions tend to assume that scholars engaged in these fields are limited to work with-
in academia. 
These perceptions have led me to explore unique branches of work where cultural 
studies and knowledge of the humanities can be applied in a practical way. One area 
where culture has become increasingly important in domestic and international politics. 
In this paper I will outline how an understanding of culture can benefit governments in 
policy making, military operations and organizing international aid efforts. I agree with 
the political theorists who argue that the studies of folklore, culture and politics should be 
inextricable.  
Anthropologists have rarely agreed to apply their understanding of culture and 
human nature to benefit those in the political sphere, namely those in the intelligence and 
national defense communities. Their opposition stems from an ethical position that it is 
wrong to use the study of culture to influence or change a person or group’s culture. De-
spite this, the application of folklore, anthropology and ethnographic studies have be-
come increasingly more valuable to politicians. A relatively new method of filtering and 
analyzing cultural data, cultural topography rose to the surface of my interdisciplinary 
studies. 
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Policy makers have long relied on scientific studies and analysis as the be-all end-
all of political insight. Geopolitics, economics, and other areas of analysis have become 
the exclusive tools used to help understand other governments, nations and groups. 
Strategic culture is a theory that expands beyond these existing tools to provide a practi-
cal application of cultural studies in a politically significant way.  
Strategic culture is conventionally characterized as the set of beliefs, assumptions, 
 attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual behavior held by strategic  
 decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to  
 achieve it… The underlying central assumption embedded within the concept is 
 ‘the belief that traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols,  
 achievements and historical experience shape strategic behavior and actual policy  
 making’… Strategic culture is an aid to understanding motivations, self-image  
 and behavior patterns of decision-makers – it ‘helps shape’ but ‘does not deter- 
 mine how an actor interacts with others in the security field’1.  
This theory fills in the gaps that previous political theories have left behind. 
Adding a cultural component to group analysis creates a more comprehensive insight into 
a group’s culture and helps us become better equipped to understand what these actors 
may do in the future. In identifying a specific actor or group’s strategic culture, Johnson 
and Berrett have outlined the Cultural Topography method as an ideal way to gather and 
analyze the collected cultural data.  
 The use of cultural studies to aid in political decision making is not new. History 
has shown us that leaders who have had an understanding of culture were more adept at 
understanding their enemies and their allies. In the 1930’s, Adolf Hitler’s shrewd percep-
tion of the importance of culture led to one of the most successful propaganda campaigns 
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in history. He not only littered the public with pamphlets and symbols, he went so far as 
to hire folklorists to rewrite children’s school books.2  He understood that people’s ideals 
and motivations come from their shared experiences, cultural narratives, and the way they 
see the world.  And these perceptions can be altered by altering their just one of these ar-
eas, like cultural narratives.  
Governments from across the political spectrum have utilized folklore as a stabiliz-
ing, unifying, and sometimes oppressive tool to support ideological positions and 
maintain power. Those that we recall most vividly are those that seem the least be-
nign: Hitler's social scientists used Germanic folk traditions to glorify the myth of 
Aryan supremacy and build the legend of the Fuhrer. Stalin reshaped existing Russ-
ian folklore to exalt the creativity of the peasantry and link the revolution of 1917 
with earlier revolts. Haiti's late dictator, Duvalier, cowed a superstitious populace 
with voodoo. Governments of Ireland, India, Egypt, Ghana, and Pakistan have 
sponsored folklore research with heavy nationalistic over-tones and more than a 
touch of patriotic bias.3 
In the intelligence community, increasing amounts of acquired data are sometimes 
meaningless without the addition of cultural analysis. Even work amongst international 
aid organizations is benefited from the understanding and application of cultural knowl-
edge. When an organization understands the culture of a people, they can better under-
stand how to meet their needs.  
 For this reason, the method of cultural mapping or topography has become an in-
valuable method for many public and private organizations at the local, national, and in-
ternational levels. By gathering cultural data including a group’s folklore, history, social 
structure, and traditions, one can paint a picture that encompasses more than one facet of 
that group of people. With this cultural map I can identify the group’s strategic culture 
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and understand what aspects of a group’s culture help shape their strategic decision mak-
ing. I seek to apply this method combined with the principles of strategic culture theory, 
which I will outline, to an international arena.  
 United States defense organizations are learning that the adoption of a cultural 
lens when planning military operations provides a better insight into both allies and 
enemies. This has become particularly relevant in situations where our military is fighting 
an insurgency on foreign soil, similar to the insurgency taking place in northern Mali. 
“Given the pivotal role of local popular opinion in this type of military engagement, un-
derstanding public culture, the cultures of significant sub-state groups, and how these af-
fect security policy becomes paramount.”4 
Area of United States Security Interest: Northern Mali
 Armed conflicts in Northern Africa have raised security concerns among U.S. in-
telligence communities. A military coup in Mali began in March 2012 in response to dis-
satisfaction with the government’s handling of Tuareg rebellions in the north, widespread 
starvation, and the infiltration of Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) groups from 
neighboring countries. Simultaneously, the northern Malian group National Movement 
for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) took control of the northern provinces of Mali, 
Kidal and Timbuctu, citing their secession from Mali and the formation of the indepen-
dent state of  Azawad.  
 Much like the IRA, this group of Tuaregs is a small but vocal minority that is 
gaining international attention. This conflict in Mali has also prompted the military inter-
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vention of U.S. allies. Due to the sensitivity of the U.S. to the increasing presence of Al 
Qaeda in Northern Africa, this area of the world is of security importance.  
 By applying the strategic culture theory to analyze the Tuareg people in Northern 
Mali I can demonstrate an effective method of more fully understanding the decision 
making patterns of an unfamiliar group of people. Though I am applying this method to 
an international arena, it can easily be applied to groups of people within the U.S. as well. 
This method could be used by politicians in determining the motivations and desires of a 
voting demographic or in an historical application. Discovering a group’s strategic culture 
by cultural mapping can shed light on the causes of a dramatic event in a society’s histo-
ry. The “Cultural Mapping method seeks to explain, “why things which happened were to 
be expected,” and then “project probabilities for future iterations”.5 
 In their article, “Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence 
Analysis”, Jeannie Johnson and Matthew Berrett define cultural mapping as: 
  A process or methodology…designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play  
 on issues of intelligence interest and to distinguish the degree to which those  
 factors influence decisions making and outcomes. Mapping exercises done across  
 time, spanning multiple issues, and on diverse groups within a society may aid in  
 understanding that society’s “Cultural Topography”.6 
  
The method of cultural mapping for identifying the strategic culture of a group 
has been applied to security analysis within the political sphere. However, to date, there is 
no other work that exemplifies the specific cultural questions that I will address, focusing 
on creating a cultural topography of the Tuareg people, specifically those who live in the 
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Northern regions of Mali. To evaluate the work that has already been done I reviewed 
several theses and journal articles that sought to address how the culture of the Tuaregs is 
impacting their actions. These theses, however, do not use this method of cultural 
mapping which was developed specifically for the intelligence community. 
Cultural topography considers four aspects of culture, norms, values, identity and 
perceptual lens. I analyzed these sources to gain information that will fit into one of the 
four classifications of cultural data as outlined by Johnson and Berrett in their article. The 
identity traits of the Tuaregs will be defined as “traits the group assigns to itself, the repu-
tation it pursues, and individual roles and statuses it designates to members.”7 This identi-
ty will be determined based on both historic and modern descriptions of the Tuaregs. The 
norms are the “accepted and expected modes of behavior” within the culture.8 The values 
of the group are defined as “material or ideational goods that are honored or that confer 
increased status to members.”9 And lastly I will explore the perceptual lens of the Tuaregs 
which is “the filter through which this group determines “facts” about others.”10 
 By gathering cultural data in these four areas, I will be able to create a cultural 
map of the Tuareg people. This map will allow me to better understand their motivations 
as well as prescribe policy recommendations that would allow the various governmental 
departments to interact with the Tuaregs in the best possible way. These cultural analyses 
will provide a unique example of how cultural studies can be used in politically relevant 
ways. These analyses are more useful because when used as part of a cultural topography, 
analysts can make important discoveries about the decision making motivations of each 
group of people. 
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 This approach is designed to be concise but thorough, including information that 
may be pertinent to policy makers or project organizers in aid organizations. It begins 
with outlining key findings, the most crucial and useful pieces of cultural data collected.  
Based on the outcome of the mapping exercise, a finished Cultural Topography 
paper will define for the reader first, which aspects of identity, norms, values and 
perceptual lens are most important to understand when the United States engages 
this actor on this issue, and second, the probable influence boundaries of the 
CCFs  [critical cultural factors] identified.11  
Then the data is filtered into one of the four categories, perceptual lens, values, 
norms and identity. After summarizing the specific cultural indicators I will outline the 
key findings for that particular section, and give policy recommendations based on that 
information gathered. 
To begin creating a cultural topography, I first delved into the history of the Tu-
aregs and the region in which they live. Although they are a minority in Mali, large num-
bers of Tuareg tribes are also spread out among other Western African nations. 
A Brief History of Mali  
 The Republic of Mali has a population of 12 million people with more than 90% 
of its citizens living in the southern half of the country.12 The most populated northern 
cities are  Kidal with a population of 25,000, Timbuktu with 32,000, and another 8,000 in 
the city of Gao.13 Historically, Mali was part of  one of the three great empires that cov-
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ered northern Africa, “the Empire of Ghana, the Empire of Mali and the Songhai Empire.
14 Each of these empires covered large amounts of Northern Africa.15 These empires 
helped mold the identity of Mali (as a nation), which centers on being a part of a greater 
whole. The national anthem of Mali still emphasizes Mali as part of Africa as a whole 
instead of on the nationalism of their own people:  
For Africa and for you, Mali, 
Our banner shall be liberty. 
For Africa and for you, Mali, 
Our fight shall be for unity. 
To make a united Africa, 
Together, arise, my brothers,  
All to the place where honour calls 16 
  
 Two centuries after the great empires of northern Africa fell, Mali became part of 
the  French Sudan.17 Mali then gained its independence in 1960, however its borders were 
much smaller than they had been during the time of the French Sudan.18 Those    living in 
the south are mostly dark skinned descendants of Africans while northern Mali is mainly 
populated by the light skinned Tuaregs.19 The Tuaregs, or Kel Tamasheq, originate from 
the Northern African Berber people.20 Although we know that the Tuaregs make up the a 
significant portion of the population of many northern African nations, their nomadic 
lifestyles make it difficult  to know exactly how many live in any one region.21 
The Tuareg population is estimated to be between 1.8 and 2.3 million.22 Today, they are 
dispersed between mostly deserted territories in Mali, Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, Niger 
and other Northern African nations, each tribe living with boundaries much smaller than 
 10
they had during colonial rule.23 “The Tuaregs comprise fewer than 35,000 in Algeria, 
70,000 in Burkina Faso, and some 20,000 in Libya; however, they represent at least 
840,000 or 7 percent of 12 million Malians and some 1.2 million people or 9.3 percent of 
13 million people in Niger.”24 
 During both colonial and post-colonial times, the Tuaregs have been at the center 
of numerous conflicts.25 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and other terrorist 
groups including Ansar Dine are now settling in the same region as the Tuareg and are 
stirring up conflicts.26 The Tuaregs are again being accused of participating in these con-
flicts, though mixed  reports make it difficult to determine the truth. Most recently, a mili-
tary coup in the capital of Bamako gave Islamist militant groups in northern Mali the op-
portunity to take control of the northern states and declare themselves an independent na-
tion.27 The Tuaregs were again in the middle of this conflict. 
 Early in the conflict, a Tuareg faction called the MNLA (National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad) was allied with the AQIM groups in Mali.28In January 2013 
the French intervened to drive out the Islamist militants and regain control of northern 
Mali.29 In April 2013 other international troops, including those from Chad began their 
withdrawal from Mali.30 France left a portion of its troops in Mali to help keep the peace 
and a UN peacekeeping force was authorized to help stabilize the country for the elec-
tions in July of 2013.31 Just before the July elections, Tuareg leaders signed ceasefire 
agreements with the Malian government.32 This treaty allowed government troops to re-
gain control of northern cities like Kidal in preparation for the elections.33 Ibrahim 
Boubacar was elected as Mali’s new president and asserted his position to unify Mali and 
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work with the Tuaregs to achieve this end.34 However in November, an incident occurred 
where government troops shot at Tuareg protesters in Kidal.35 Accounts differ as to who 
started the attack, but Tuaregs used the incident as reason to break their ceasefire.36  The 
complexity of Tuareg alliances is illustrated in maps the have been published on various 
websites (See appendix). Each map shows the same geographic area, however they have 
been modified to identify a different group as the sole perpetrator of the attacks. 
 Given how little we know about the Tuaregs, this particular group has become a 
wildcard in terms of their potential cooperation or resistance to international interven-
tions. The goal of my research is to provide insight into the culture of the Tuaregs, partic-
ularly how their culture affects their participation in this current conflict with Islamist 
militants in Northern Mali.  
 By creating a cultural topography, I hope to shed light on the effect another war in 
Mali will have on the region as well as on U.S. interests in northern Africa. As I expound 
upon the Tuareg’s history and motives I plan to highlight areas that would be most help-
ful should the U.S. choose to intervene either diplomatically or militarily in Mali.  
 I also explored several theses that analyzed the Tuareg culture both today and in 
the past. In addition to academic and media sources I studied several travel logs from the 
time of colonial French Sudan and used all these to gather an image of Tuareg cultural 
traits that have been ingrained since the seventeen and eighteen hundreds. These original 
sources served as the entirety of my research materials.  In an ideal situation I would have       
conducted first person interview with Tuaregs and others in Mali to gain a greater depth 
of understanding of their motives and cultural traits.   
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A Cultural Topography of the Tuaregs in Northern Mali 
 After filtering all the cultural data into each of the 4 categories outlines as part of 
the cultural mapping method, I reveal key findings about the Tuaregs. These observations 
are designed to be relevant to the Tuaregs strategic culture. They are also modeled after 
key policy recommendations that are typically given to U.S. policy makers when analysts 
present these cultural data in briefs.  
Tuareg Identity 
 Northern Africa has become the latest hotbed for Al Qaeda recruitment.37     
Northern Mali is strategically located near the border of Algeria and is not far from other 
countries whose political and military instability has caused international problems, such 
as Egypt and Libya.  The Tuareg people of Northern Mali are an underrepresented ethnic 
group caught in the middle of this tumultuous region. Tuareg history is a long and proud 
one that glorifies their status as the noble warriors of the desert.38  
 French troops had temporarily regained the regions overtaken by Islamist extrem-
ists in the last year, but permanent stability is yet to be achieved. The Tuaregs have be-
come engrossed in this conflict which centers in the northern region of Mali, their main 
tribal grounds. Their true motives and values are unclear to the majority of those inside 
and outside Mali.  Anti-Tuareg overtures are coming from the Malian government as well 
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as from neighboring nations who see this nomadic people as the cause of the problems 
and not the potential solution.39 Successful U.S. involvement in this region hinges on our 
ability elevate the Tuaregs to the role of ally and active participant in international dis-
courses in the region.  
 Part of the Tuareg’s identity stems from their Islamic faith and one specific identi-
ty trait  involves traditional dress. “Unlike many Muslim societies, Tuareg women do not 
traditionally wear the veil, whereas men do.”40 The Tuareg men traditionally use blue fab-
ric for this head covering which has lead to them being described as the blue men of the 
desert.41  This simple difference in the Tuareg’s religious practices could prove a critical 
piece of information for any organization   
Finding: Tuaregs Have the Potential To Provide a Recruiting Ground for Al Qaeda 
 After analyzing what cultural factors make up the Tuareg’s identity I resolved 
three key points that would be important to any agency hoping to understand the Tuareg’s 
strategic culture.  First, The U.S.’s reluctance to communicate with Tuaregs could prove 
detrimental if Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, recruitment of Tuaregs con-
tinues.  Second, Tuareg alliances with extremists groups are temporary and opportunistic 
but may still hurt regional stability.  Third, destabilization in Northern Mali holds the po-
tential to disrupt oil production in neighboring countries and increase training and recruit-
ing grounds for AQIM and other terrorist groups.  And lastly, conflicts between the Tu-
aregs and outsiders will limit international ability to end smuggling, illegal arms trades 
and human trafficking along the Mali border. 
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 However, their religious tradition may provide a sticking point with some Al Qae-
da factions.  The tradition of Tuareg men wearing veils instead of Tuareg women would 
be a point of friction to Al Qaeda groups that wanted to establish Sharia law including the 
mandatory covering of the heads of women.  
Finding: Tuareg’s Tradition of Ethnic Privilege Foreshadows Continued Conflicts with 
Malian Government and Potential AQIM Involvement  
 Tuaregs were some of the first to settle in Northern Africa and they view their  
indigenous status as a proof of their superiority.42  This idea of ethnic superiority has    
created a rift between Tuaregs and the central government in Mali.43  Views of supremacy 
and inferiority coincide with the structure of the Tuaregs highly hierarchical society, 
which is determined by lineage. 44  
Tamasheq society is based on a set of social strata into which one is born…At the 
top of this society stood the imushagh… or noble warriors…and perceived as 
racially ‘white’…The first group…distinguished from the imushagh were the   
ineslemen…: A group of free or noble status, racially described as ‘white’… The 
imghad… formed a third group. This group consisted of free, ‘white’ people who 
were not noble, but who tried to live according to the temushagha, the noble way 
of life… The inadan … or craftsmen, generally simply referred to as ‘black-
smiths’...were racially classified as ‘black’, but free. …At the bottom were the 
iklan: The slaves, divided into various subgroups which were all categorized as 
‘black’.”45 
  
 Their societal structure has also incorporated elements from their adopted faith of 
Islam, particularly the idea of the infidel, or those people who have no faith.46  It has also 
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afforded extremist groups, such as AQIM, the opportunity to exploit this difference and 
gain favor with some Tuareg factions.47 Their view of ethnic superiority brings a sense of 
pride that inhibits the Tuareg’s ability to collaborate with the unification aims of the cen-
tral government.48  
 Ethnic privilege among Tuaregs dates back to the native Berbers taking           
possession of the lands in Northern Africa before the 7th century.49 As Berbers the        
Tuaregs do not see themselves as black or as part of the racial majority in Mali.50 Accord-
ing to Tuareg tradition, those of Arab descent are considered black.51 Their indigenous 
status feeds into their idea that the blacks, especially in the south of the country, have no 
right to rule over them.52 Traditions of hierarchy continue between the social classes with-
in Tuareg tribes and it is displeasing to them that the blacks who hold the majority of the 
offices in the central government do not cater to these social norms and acknowledge 
their inferiority to the Tuaregs.53  
 The Tuaregs make distinctions between “Koual, black; shaggaran, red; and satte-
fen, blueish black,” and each of these fits into a particular social group within their cul-
ture.54 These influence Tuareg opinions of the ruling class and most Tuaregs would rather 
be ruled by infidels than by blacks.55 Slavery of blacks has existed among the Tuaregs for 
hundreds of years.  Even today, as slavery has officially been abolished, those of the low-
est hierarchical class continue to pay an honorary tribute to the nobles of their tribes.56  
Historically, only infidels or non believers could legally be enslaved.57 
 Since the Malian capital is located in southern Mali, where the population is    
predominately of Arab decent and therefore black, the Tuaregs refuse to acknowledge the 
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government’s authority.58  Some militant groups, including AQIM, have preyed upon the 
Tuareg’s dissatisfaction with their current government by providing support and           
acknowledging their sovereignty.  This has led some Tuareg factions to rely on AQIM for 
support. Another connection to the AQIM is their shared Islamic faith.59 
 Race plays a role in determining an individual’s place in the Tuareg social        
hierarchy as well as his or her individual lineage.60  Each Tuareg tribe is divided by      
distinct social structure and hierarchical order.61  This social order is not fully understood 
to most people outside the Tuareg society, making efforts to identify and reach out to the 
actual leaders of these clans challenging.62  Tuaregs follow a social system that one is 
born into, “’Who you are’ is defined through ‘whom you are related to’”. 63 
 The exact name and responsibilities of each social class have changed over the 
centuries and are debated among the Tuaregs themselves.64  Known as the noble warrior, 
the Imushagh is the highest social order and is the most revered group among the Tu-
aregs.65 This group is still distinguished by their lineage as part of the former ruling caste, 
even if they are not currently the leaders of the clans.66  
 Tuareg ideas of superiority are a red line to be aware of. Their strict beliefs in 
racial stratification could cause tension should the U.S. seek to identify AQIM members 
in northern Mali. The Tuareg distrust of the central government in Mali should also be 
considered. If offered control of a particular region (the northern region of Mali) or re-
sources such as livestock or agricultural resources by AQIM groups, their loyalties would 
not lie with the Malian government. When working in Northern Mali, outsiders should 
treat the leaders of Tuareg tribes as leaders of their own autonomous group. It is also im-
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portant to understand that the central government has no effectual power in the North of 
Mali. 
 A more drastic and possibly more effective course of action would be to allow the 
Tuaregs to have an area of northern Mali as their own autonomous state. Since more than 
90% of Malians (non-nomadic Tuaregs) live in southern Mali this arrangement may not 
be an impossible feat.67 
 Tuareg’s disdain of southerners, mostly those they consider blacks, makes it im-
practicable for a central government based in the South to maintain any hold over the Tu-
aregs of the North.68 The Tuaregs have never officially recognized the central govern-
ment, or even the existence of Mali as its own nation-state, though Tuaregs have been 
instated in some local government positions in an effort to incorporate them into the state 
government.69 They do not identify themselves as Malians at all, but purely as Tuaregs or 
Kel Tamasheq, speakers of the Tamasheq language.70      
Tuareg Norms 
 Many scholars have come to understand that the nomadic lifestyle of theTuaregs 
results in a deep appreciation of their land and a spiritual connection to their natural re-
sources.71 Many misinterpretations of this way of life have caused rifts between the Tu-
aregs and the central Malian government.72 These differences are another example of how 
even their fellow Malians can struggle to understand their motivations. Some Tuaregs be-
lieve that an independent nation would be the best way for them to maintain their lands 
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and gain the autonomy that they have sought for decades.73 Their desire for independence 
has motivated numerous Tuareg rebellions before and after Mali’s independence from 
France.74 These factors have created a window of opportunity for extremist groups to step 
in and exploit the desires of the Tuaregs by offering resources that the southern govern-
ment is not providing.75  If extremists continue to provide what international and domes-
tic organizations cannot or will not provide, then the Tuaregs stand to become a major 
source of man power for militant groups including AQIM that have already extended 
their aggression to international areas, most recently the attacks on the BP oil plant in Al-
geria in January of 2013.76
 The Tuaregs have roamed the lands of Northern Africa for hundreds of years,   
disregarding the nation-states established during colonial times.77 Historically they  popu-
lated the lands now known as Mali, Algeria and Niger after the Arab invasions in the 7th 
and 11th centuries.78 They continue to ignore international boundaries and choose to go 
wherever they are least disturbed,79 at times even ignoring the existence of these neigh-
boring states altogether.80  When one nation applied unwanted pressure to the Tuaregs, 
they simply crossed the border into a neighboring country.81 This flip flopping is one of 
the Tuareg traits that has the potential to cause difficulties in international attempts to se-
cure the borderlands from smuggling as well as human trafficking.82  According to several 
sources, illegal trafficking is a common source of income for poor groups in Northern 
Africa.83 Smuggling, mainly across the Algerian border has become the natural successor 
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to the caravan trade.84As the Tuaregs traverse the desert they come into contact with mili-
tant groups  including AQIM groups who use these borderlands as smuggling routes.85   
 I agree that the similarities made between the insurgency in northern Mali and 
Afghanistan cannot be  ignored.  These terrorist cells and organized smuggling rings also 
use the mountains of northern Mali as places to hide their bases of operations, not unlike 
in the mountains of Afghanistan.86 The Al Qaeda cells in Mali could be established in the 
same ares that Tuaregs have been living for centuries.87 The Tuaregs are familiar with 
these mountains, which remain mostly unpopulated, and as a result of their familiarity 
with the region they can provide good opportunities for the U.S. if intelligence agencies  
desires to gather intel on these  terrorist groups and others in the region. The Tuaregs 
would be the ideal group with whom to cooperate creating an opportunity to gather intel 
on AQIM locations should the U.S. gain favor with the Tuaregs. 
 While interacting with the Tuaregs, the AQIM are playing off of their desire for 
independence to gain the allegiance of some Tuareg factions, including the MNLA and 
the smaller Ansar al-Din.88 Several groups have distinguished themselves as the most apt 
to join forces with extremist groups in the name of independence, most notably the 
MNLA.89 The AQIM use the Tuareg’s disenfranchised perspective to recruit Tuaregs and 
increase resistance towards their government.90 
  
 The [AQIM] has increased its recruitment of a number of disenchanted   
 and  marginalized citizens in the Sahel. Although the actual count of Tuareg  
 members of the [AQIM] remains unknown, the [AQIM] has been able to recruit a  
 number of them because of its goal of filling the social and ideological void left  
 by decades of neglect and mismanagement by the governments of Mali and  
 Niger…The result is that the youth tend to follow any demagogue who promises a 
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 better future than the incumbent leadership. This logic also applies to the Sahel  
 region. In fact, the [AQIM] seems to have increased the number of social services  
 in many parts of the Sahel, thus attracting a large number of destitute youth.91 
 The Tuareg factions that are most likely to be attracted to the AQIM overtures are 
those who are members of Tuareg independence groups, such as the MNLA. Though 
these groups have actively sought Tuareg independence, not all Tuaregs agree with their 
separatist methods.92 However, they are the most vocal and the most active in participat-
ing with extremist groups.  
  
Finding: Tuareg attempts at receiving autonomy are propelled by the making and break-
ing of pacts with the Malian government, AQIM and others104  
 Their value of independence has led them to make opportunistic treaties creating 
this well established norm of treaty breaking.  Increasing terrorist threats in the region 
have turned international attention to the agreements made between various Tuareg tribal 
leaders and AQIM leaders.105 With their history of making pacts, sometimes under threat 
of military action, understanding the Tuareg habit of  breaking agreements can help the 
U.S. understand how to do business with the Tuaregs should intervention in northern 
Mali become prudent.  
 Since the colonial invasion of France, where the Tuareg’s initial cooperation was 
met with policies that marginalized their people, the Tuaregs have been unhappy with  
being ruled by an outside force.106 “Over the course of time the Tuareg tactic had re-
mained constant: negotiate a position that will provide an advantage in future conflicts 
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and then break the peace accord under when a convenient pretext presents itself.”107 Un-
der French colonial rule Tuaregs “remained influential right up until the start of the twen-
tieth century…signing peace treaties with the French in 1905.”108 Peace agreements were 
signed between Tuareg leaders and Malian government officials in January 1991, April 
1992, and again in 1996.109 
 After the Peace Pact in 1996 many Tuareg rebels were integrated into the Malian 
national army and the university and civil service.110 After becoming dissatisfied with the 
military and government, many Tuaregs deserted the Malian army and went back to the 
mountains of Northern Mali.111 Enlisting in the army was another agreement that the Tu-
aregs did not feel compelled to keep after participation in the Malian army no longer met 
their needs or expectations. This perpetual infringement of treaties and pacts gives the 
U.S. a good insight into the possible actions of the Tuaregs and their involvement with 
AQIM.  
 In January of 2013 Tuaregs were again changing their strategic allegiances     
“Tuareg forces [have] broken with their former Islamist militant allies and have made 
peace overtures to the French and Malian governments”.112 This most recent change in 
their strategic alliances can give the U.S. confidence in the fact that if Tuaregs again join 
forces with AQIM, this may not be a permanent arrangement.  
 Based on this information I can add to my cultural map the finding that Tuareg 
Patterns of Breaking Treaties Present U.S. Opportunities. This fluctuating loyalty is cru-
cial for the U.S. to understand if they are to work with the Tuareg’s in the future.  
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 Tuareg disregard for permanent treaties can be a sticking point for local          
governments but can also be a leverage point for the U.S.. If Tuareg cooperation becomes 
prudent, the U.S. may craft strategically advantageous treaties with the Tuaregs with the 
full knowledge that these agreements are seen as temporary. These patterns of instability 
can be a short-term strategic negotiation tool if the U.S. required cooperation from       
Tuareg leaders. In the long term, however, the United States cannot count on permanent 
Tuareg allegiance.  
 Tuareg involvement in smuggling, kidnapping and human trafficking is one of 
their perceived norms that cannot be entirely verified. Though it is true that Islamist    
extremist groups are associated with human trafficking, some reports insist that Tuaregs 
do not entirely identify with the Islamist extremists.113 These reports claim their modes of 
operation vary drastically from these radical groups. According to these sources, mostly 
academic, most Tuareg independence groups do not kidnap for monetary gain, but only to 
draw attention to their neglected state.114 However, it is unclear exactly how many clans 
or groups do or do not participate in smuggling and human trafficking.  
 Other sources, mostly Internet commentators, bloggers and news media sources 
claim that the Tuaregs are participating in smuggling alongside AQIM and other          
extremist groups, citing that Tuaregs are using these activities as revenue generators 
while other sources state it is clear that “Tuaregs have never kidnapped for ransom.”115 
These popular media sources paint the Tuaregs as the instigators of almost every armed 
conflict and terrorist activity in the Maghreb region.  
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 Tuareg fighters were found fighting as mercenaries for Mouamar Gaddafi in 2011 
although they were motivated not by the desire to fight, but by the overtures of Gaddafi’s 
who said, “Libya regarded itself as the protector of the Tuaregs and that Libya had been 
the Tuaregs’ ancestral home before they spread to…Mali.”116  Some Tuareg leaders 
adamantly deny any Tuareg involvement in most of these attacks. However, these leaders 
do not speak for the entire people, and splinter groups like MNLA and Ansar al-Din have 
been involved.  
 These norms of kidnapping and fighting as mercenaries are difficult to add to the 
Tuareg’s cultural topography because they are not conformed. These stories of extremist 
behavior also do not include the entire Tuareg people. This uncertainty about Tuareg’s 
methods of operation can confuse outsiders which will make this norm difficult to react 
to. 
 This drastically skewed portrait of Tuareg activities is another reason why the US 
should make an effort to communicate directly to clan leaders. The most effective course 
of action would be to gather intelligence locally to determine where the Tuaregs are     
involved and where they are not. Having an internal view of the Mali and Algerian     
borders will benefit Tuareg relations by helping to clarify their involvement or alleged 
involvement in terrorist attacks.  
 Traditional diplomatic routes would be complicated if the U.S. chose to intervene 
in Northern Mali. The Tuaregs believe their ethnic group is not only very distinct from 
the main Malian population, but also completely disconnected from the nation and central 
government. The threat of Al Qaeda recruitment and their alliances with Tuaregs is       
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further complicated by Tuareg perceptions that they are outside of Malian governmental 
control. The Tuareg’s self interest is their most salient motivator and their ideas of        
superiority help solidify behavior patterns or actions chains.  
Tuareg Values 
 The Tuaregs view their land as synonymous with independence. To them land and 
the resources on that land are the ultimate symbol of independence.93 As a people who 
value independence, they desire a return to their own nomadic state with freedom to roam 
over the lands that historically belonged to them.94 Their value of independence through 
access to land has nothing to do with its monetary value, but its spiritual value and its 
ability to keep them alive.95  
 Natural disasters such as an increasing number of droughts have dried up the   
limited recourses on land that Tuaregs have been allotted by the Malian government.96 As 
droughts decreased the food supply, Tuareg leaders turned to the centralized Malian gov-
ernment for aid, which they were most often denied.97  
 There is also some speculation among Tuaregs that the reason the government 
fails to allow them autonomy is because “the deserts of Tuareg lands in Northern Niger 
and eastern Mali are the world’s third largest uranium reserves as well as substantial oil 
reserves.”98  
 The Tuareg view of the land is also incompatible with national borders and     
immigration laws.99 “The construction of artificial political boundaries that define a 
state’s territory is anathema to communities like the…Tuareg that have ranged             
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historically over land that today sits astride multiple political states”.100 Without their own 
autonomous state, Tuaregs have been forced to adhere to property and border laws of 
state governments that they believe do not represent their interests.101 Incentives from the 
Malian government have not quelled the desire of many Tuaregs to gain an autonomous 
state of their own.102 This also adds credibility to the theory accusing the Malian govern-
ment of refusing the Tuaregs their own state because the lands on which they live houses 
huge stores of uranium and oil deposits, leaving no place for the Tuaregs to go.103    
Finding:  Tuareg Values of Nomadic Living and Independence Present Concerns in Se-
curing the Malian Border 
 By gaining this understanding to the Tuareg’s nomadic lifestyle I was able to fur-
ther outline their strategic culture. I was led to the conclusion that their nomadic lifestyle 
creates jurisdictional concerns when attempts are made to control illegal activities along 
the Malian border. The United States has backed proposals to stop border trafficking in 
this area, including trafficking of illegal weapons to militant groups. Giving the Tuaregs a 
distinct portion of land is one of the few options that would appease them and help con-
trol their currently unobserved borders of northern Mali. If the Malian government were 
to allow them exclusive control over the northern states of Gao and Kidal, the Tuaregs 
would be more likely to observe national laws and statues while applying their own set of 
regulations. Tuareg history shows that they may be mollified for a time and then choose 
to rebel again to gain full independence. Nothing less than full autonomy will ever com-
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pletely balance out the Tuareg’s value of independence with the Malian governments’ au-
thority.  
  
Tuareg Perceptual Lens 
 Though Tuaregs view themselves as ethnically superior, the view of neighboring 
nations and the Malian government is opposite.  During French colonial rule, Tuareg    
resistance furthered their reputation for rebelliousness and civil unrest.  The French also 
failed to grasp the structure of their nomadic culture and instead defined them as “unruly 
anarchists averse to organization and control”.117 This is yet another example of cultural 
misunderstanding leading to decades and even centuries of unnecessary conflict. Their 
constant participation in conflicts created the image they were intensely fierce warriors 
when they occasion warranted.118  This image was exemplified by a Tuareg proverb, 
“"Kiss the hand you cannot sever.”119 Neighboring countries also interpreted their no-
madism as proof of laziness, stupidity and lack of refinement.120  This is the same way 
Tuaregs view most blacks in Africa, with this lens of inferiority.121  Instability in the 
Malian government has also led to a fear of Tuareg rebellions due to the national mili-
tary’s lack of motivation or resources to deal with future rebellions.122 
 Bordering nations especially see the Tuaregs as a hotbed of civil unrest and      
violent attacks. After the rumors of Tuareg involvement in the BP plant incident, Algeria 
professed its disdain for Tuareg contamination: 
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The Algerian fear of contagion is also well-founded because of the connections 
established between Algerian Islamic fundamentalists, such as the GSPC (now 
AQIM), and certain Tuareg rebel groups that share common arm suppliers from 
Libya and Chadian Tibesti.123 
 Confusion over Tuareg social and political structures also promotes the image that 
Tuaregs are a disorganized and primitive people. Outsiders fail to fully understand the 
Tuareg’s social and tribal structure. The Tuaregs use these misconceptions to their         
advantage by helping to keep their societal exclusivity. Tribal organizational structure 
confuses outsiders who attempt to determine which factions of Tuaregs are actually in-
volved in radical and violent movements. 
Finding: Tuareg’s Perceive Outsiders As Inferior Causing Friction In Diplomatic Efforts 
 Tuareg identity is based on their feelings of ethnic superiority, their identity as 
“lords of the desert, defiant and proud of their culture and traditions had a tremendous 
impact on…policy towards [them]”.124  “According to this vision the Arabo-Berber…liv-
ing their harsh nomadic life in the Sahara, were naturally of a higher order than the 
‘black’ inhabitants of Soudan Francais, and saw themselves as their natural lords and 
masters”.125 Feelings of Tuareg ethnic superiority inhibit the ability of the United States 
to use traditional diplomatic methods to reach out to this separated group. This attitude 
fosters an enormous pride among the Tuaregs that can come in conflict with any     
diplomatic negotiations in which they are not directly involved. As the Tuaregs make an 
effort to preserve the purity of their race and culture, outsiders are completely shut out 
unless they require external aid.  
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 Historical examples show how Tuaregs cooperate with inferior groups merely as a 
means to their own ends.126 This perspective reflects the way Tuaregs that felt about their 
black slaves as well, they see the “politicians and inhabitants of the South as an        
overwhelming mass of religiously ignorant and uncivilized black, with whom they had 
nothing in common and with whom they either had nothing to do or who they had      
previously dominated”.127 Tuaregs will ally with whichever group is offering to provide 
these resources and services. 
 To use this world view as an asset, the United States should offer aid in the form 
of  infrastructure projects and supplies to the Tuaregs as an act of good will. A seat at the 
negotiating table would also do a lot to create feeling of trust and respect among the    
Tuaregs. One potential area of development would be the uranium and oil mines in  
northern Mali. The central government is limited in its ability to take advantage of these 
resources, potentially due to the political instability in the region.  Providing the Tuaregs 
with mining facilities, while allowing them to share a percentage of the profits with the 
government may be an ideal way to promote cooperation between the two groups and 
place the Tuaregs in debt to the US.  
 However, the if the  U.S. were to construct these projects it would be prudent to 
send small USAID or nonprofit groups as opposed to large-scale aid companies. Any illu-
sion of an American invasion or occupation would likely cause Tuareg resentment to-
wards the U.S. as another colonial power. If the United States were to gain this Tuareg 
trust, this would be a very beneficial avenue to  receive intelligence on AQIM movements 
in Mali.  
 29
Finding: Tuareg’s View Themselves as Disenfranchised Creating the Need for Targeted 
Diplomatic Communication 
 They believe the Malian government is actively ignoring their requests for aid and 
development and the government intentionally neglects them.128  As the U.S. and other 
international powers have also failed to show much interest in the plight of the Tuaregs, 
they continue to feel neglected by the world. This point of view is argued back and forth 
in many forums but there is evidence to help us understand exactly where the idea came 
from. During the French regime, overt racisms against all Africans was common in Mali. 
The French also denied many Tuareg attempts at autonomy during the colonial period 
and sought to eliminate their racial privilege.129 After the Tuareg rebellions in the 1960’s 
the Malian government placed  northern Mali and the Tuareg people under strict military 
rule.130 Severe droughts in northern Mali in the 1970’s caused many deaths among the 
Tuaregs and the government did not or was not able to provide sufficient aid to them.131 
 Current international efforts to bring peace to this area are hindered by their lack 
of effort to understand this Tuareg perception. Tuareg leaders feel they have not been 
properly included in the efforts to bring peace to the region.132 
 It may not be within the power of the United States to directly improve Tuaregs 
view of their government. However, the Malian government could benefit from the    
support of U.S. diplomatic teams to make suggestions how best to interact with the      
distinct ethnic group within their borders. Instead of ignoring the Tuaregs or attempting to 
rule them with a heavy hand, the government would benefit from applying negotiation 
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techniques. If the U.S. chooses this course of action, it would be most beneficial to work 
from a purely supervisory position and to downplay their involvement to the Tuaregs. 
They may see this as another attempt at foreign powers attempting to control their region. 
Outlook for the U.S. Application of the Tuareg Cultural Topography 
 Based on the Tuareg’s identity as “lords of the desert” and their value of indepen-
dence I safely say that the Tuaregs are a group that should not be ignored. Due to their 
strategic location near terrorist hotspots and their normative behavioral pattern of break-
ing treaties, the U.S. should proceed with caution if intervention in Mali becomes pru-
dent. Their shifting loyalty is the most worrisome part of their strategic culture. The main 
motivating factors for them are independence and autonomy. Some Tuareg groups are 
actively allying themselves with AQIM and this can be stopped if they feel their needs 
and desires for independence and autonomy can be satisfied through other means. Any 
aid that can help reverse the effects of the severe droughts in the North would be a valu-
able asset to the Tuaregs.  
 If the U.S. were to intervene in Northern Mali to help prevent AQIM from gaining 
a foothold, they would do well to recognize that the Tuaregs cannot be written off. Giving 
Tuareg leaders some form of autonomy over their lands or at least allowing them an un-
encumbered range of land would be the best way to coax Tuareg cooperation should the 
U.S. need it.  
 In the event of an intervention the U.S. may encounter hostility if Tuareg leaders 
are ignored. If the U.S. wants to prevent Mali from becoming an AQIM recruitment area, 
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the Tuareg leaders must be involved. To prevent Tuareg resistance to U.S. overtures, they 
should conference with the main Tuareg tribal leaders at the same time as they coordinate 
with the Mali government. The Tuaregs would respond well to the US’s acknowledgment 
of the Tuareg’s autonomous tribal state. 
 Tuareg ideas of superiority are another a red line to be aware of. Their strict belief 
in racial stratification could cause tension should the U.S. seek to identify AQIM mem-
bers in northern Mali. Tuareg distrust of the central government in Mali should also be 
taken into consideration. If offered control of a particular region or resources by AQIM 
groups, their loyalties would not lie with the Malian government. When working in 
Northern Mali, outsiders should treat the leaders of Tuareg tribes as leaders of their own             
autonomous group. The U.S must assume that the central government has no real power 
in the North of Mali.  
 Tuareg tendencies to break treaties may be a problem if the US engages in     
diplomatic overtures with them. However, having knowledge beforehand of this tendency 
will give the U.S. an upper hand in predicting Tuareg actions. Should the U.S. make a 
move to help stabilize northern Mali, the Tuaregs could be the best allies in eliminating 
the terrorist threats developing in Northern Mali.  
Conclusion 
 This example of a cultural topography based on the methods of strategic culture 
can aid in the use of mounds of cultural data collected by anthropologists, folklorists and 
others. It is clear that this information can be applied more than some may have thought. 
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The use of cultural analysis can be helpful and academic but I contest that the applica-
tions in international development, aid or government organizations can not only save 
resources but can save lives.  Funds can be more properly allocated, counterinsurgency 
can increase their effectiveness, and international development projects can be benefit 
more people if cultural factors are taken into consideration. I do not presume to state that 
culture is the only factor that should be considered when determining policy but I do pro-
pose that the increase in cultural understanding can be a great benefit when added to the 
conventional avenues of information gathering and analysis.  
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